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YOU MAKE ME FEEL LIKE A NATURAL WOMAN:1
ALLOWING PARENTS TO CONSENT TO EARLY GENDER
ASSIGNMENT SURGERIES FOR THEIR
INTERSEXED INFANTS
The current model of treatment for intersexed
infants fails the test for legal informed consent at
every step. No matter how well-meaning their
intentions, parents are incapable of giving legal
informed consent to the performance of genital-
normalizing surgery on their infants...2
INTRODUCTION
From the Constitutional Court of Columbia 3 to the Intersex
Society of North America,4 numerous jurists, researchers,5
physicians, 6 and intersex organizations' are engaged in a struggle
over the legality of early gender assignment surgeries. Opponents
to these procedures charge that they are both needless and
harmful to intersexed infants,8 and share many of the abhorrent
characteristics of female circumcision and sexual abuse.9
Advocating the imposition of a legal moratorium on gender
assignment surgery, many of these activists argue that parents
1. ARETHA FRANKLIN, (You Make Me Feel) Like a Natural Woman on LADY SOUL
(Atlantic Records 1967).
2. Kishka-Kamari Ford, Note, "First, Do No Harm" - The Fiction of Legal Parental
Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'YREV. 469,
488 (2001).
3. The Constitutional Court of Columbia recently held that gender assignment surgery
should be postponed until the intersexed child is mature enough to consent. In a related
decision, the Court also held that intersexuals comprise a protected minority under the law.
For a brief discussion of these decisions, see Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An
Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment
Surgery on Infants With Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, n.92 (2000).
4. See Amicus Brief from the Intersex Society of North America to the Constitutional
Court of Colombia (Feb. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Amicus Briefl, available at http://www.isna.
org/colombia/brief.htm.
5. See generally Beh & Diamond, supra note 3 (outlining the current research on
intersex children).
6. Interview with Galen M. Schauer, M.D., Perinatal and Placental Pathologist,
Children's Hospitals and Clinics, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 25, 2003).
7. Amicus Brief, supra note 4.
8. Ford, supra note 2, at 469.
9. Julie Cole, Legal Issues on the Treatment of Children with Intersex Conditions (Apr.
6, 2003), at http://home.vicnet.net.au/-aissg/legal-issues.htm.
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of intersexed infants lack the legal capacity to consent to these
surgeries on behalf of their children."0
Admittedly, these procedures are replete with complications
and risks, and often fail to address the true needs and interests of
intersexed infants and their families." Nevertheless, considerable
authority suggests that these surgeries are often both medically
and legally appropriate. 2 From a medical standpoint, gender
assignment surgeries frequently benefit both intersexed infants
and their parents." From a legal standpoint, a multitude of
sources support a parent's ability to provide legal consent for
these surgeries on behalf of their intersexed infants. 4 In light of
the foregoing evidence and support for parental consent, it would
be both unwise and unjust for American lawmakers to impose a
legal moratorium on early gender assignment surgeries.
Before debating the merits of a moratorium on gender
assignment surgeries, it is imperative to review the development of
the traditional surgical model of care for intersexed infants as well
as the various medical foundations supporting this model. It is
also necessary to examine courts' historical recognition of parental
consent on behalf of incompetent minors. After surveying the
current state of medical knowledge on intersex conditions and
assessing the treatment of the consent doctrine throughout
American jurisprudence and academic discourse, this note argues
that there is considerable evidence suggesting that parents
may legally consent to gender assignment surgeries on behalf
of their intersexed infants. At this juncture, the institution of
a legal moratorium on gender assignment surgeries would be
inappropriate, premature, and potentially harmful to a large
number of individuals."
10. Ford, supra note 2, at 469.
11. Intersex Babies: Controversy Over Operating to Change Ambiguous Genitalia (ABC
News Television Broadcast, Apr. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Intersex Babies).
12. See, e.g., Peter Lee & Philip A. Gruppuso, Point / Counterpoint: Should Cosmetic
Surgery Be Performed on the Genitals of Children Born With Ambiguous Genitals?,
PHYSICIAN'S WKLY, Aug. 16, 1999, available at http://physiciansweekly.com/archive/
99/08 16_99/pc.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
13. Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, M.D., Pediatric Urologist, Pediatric Urology
Associates, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct 25, 2003).
14. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 37-42.
15. See, e.g., Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics & the Law,
11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 236 (2002). Professor Hermer concludes that:
[ciontrary to some recommendations ... a moratorium on cosmetic genital and
sex assignment surgeries for infants and children is not warranted. It would
swing the pendulum to the other extreme: while such surgeries have previously
been recommended and performed with scant, if any, data to support their
beneficial effects, a moratorium would similarly cease all such surgeries on the
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Part I discusses the legal options currently being pursued by
moratorium advocates, offers some background information on
intersex conditions and the historical development of the surgical
model of care, and highlights the risks, potential drawbacks, and
benefits, of gender assignment surgery. Part II examines the
framework of the informed consent doctrine and its applicability in
the context of parental consent for the medical treatment of minor
children. Among the topics Part II discusses are the possibility
that the conditions for informed consent are not always met in
cases of early gender assignment surgery and the overarching legal
tradition of deference to parental wishes regarding the treatment
of incompetent minor children. Part III outlines the substituted
judgment and best interests tests, explores some of the difficulties
with applying these standards to early gender assignment surgery,
and suggests that parental involvement in treatment decisions
might minimize some of these difficulties. Part IV refutes the
allegation that early gender assignment surgery is experimental
and merely cosmetic, providing no concrete benefits to the
intersexed infant. Part V stresses the reasons why parents and
doctors are better decision-makers than the courts and legislatures
with respect to early gender assignment surgery, and argues
against the imposition of a one-size-fits-all value judgment on all
intersexed infants by instituting a moratorium on gender
assignment surgery.
BACKGROUND
Legal Options Currently Being Explored By Moratorium
Advocates
Numerous intersex activists, doctors, and researchers urge
the imposition of a legal moratorium on early gender-assignment
surgeries. 6 The precise nature of the desired moratorium,
however, remains unclear. Some moratorium advocates choose to
encourage the medical community to rethink its approach to
intersexed infants by educating its members about the risks and
basis of several small studies and some negative reports from a number of
individuals who underwent the surgeries in infancy and childhood.
Id.
16. See generally Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 1; see also Anne Scheck, Intersexuality
Debate Takes a Conservative Turn, UROLOGY TIMES, Feb. 1998, at 1 (emphasizing that
gender refers to more than just the genitals).
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negative outcomes of these procedures."v Presumably, these
individuals hope to discourage the practice of gender assignment
surgery by reducing the number of physicians and surgeons willing
to perform such surgery thus instituting a sort of voluntary,
supply-driven moratorium."8 Other opponents of surgery produce
news broadcasts,"2 write journal articles, 20 design websites,2" and
pursue other ways of stimulating public discourse about the
risks and drawbacks of gender assignment surgery, while
promoting the acceptance of intersex individuals in American
society. These activists seemingly hope to lessen the demand for
gender assignment surgery in the United States and create a
voluntary, demand-driven moratorium on surgery by fostering
an environment in which the parents of intersexed infants will
not feel pressured to surgically alter their children so that their
anatomy may resemble those of 'normal,' non-intersexed children.
Other activists call for a mandatory moratorium on early gender
assignment surgery, presumably imposed through statutes or
court decisions.
Background: The Meaning of'Intersex'
There is no universally-accepted definition of "intersex." One
medical professional defines intersexed individuals as "those
persons who possess the physical characteristics of both sexes
in their gonadal, genital, or reproductive structures or their
chromosomal composition."22 Expanding on that definition, other
commentators strive to recognize the inherent ambiguities and
contradictions of the term:
17. See generally Chanika Phornphutkul et al., Gender Self-Reassignment in an XY
Adolescent Female Born With Ambiguous Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 135-37 (2000)
(discussing an intersexual assigned the female gender at birth but reverted to the male
gender during adolescence).
18. See Interview with Galen M. Schauer, supra note 6 (discussing the practice of
educating other medical professionals about the potential risks and drawbacks of gender
assignment surgery).
19. See, e.g., Intersex Babies, supra note 11.
20. See, e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 3.
21. For instance, the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) has developed a web site
that helps promote the ISNA's view that gender assignment surgery should be postponed
until the intersexed children are mature enough to make their own choices about surgical
sex assignments. The ISNA website can be viewed at http://www.isna.org.
22. Robert M. Blizzard, Intersex Issues: A Series of Continuing Conundrums, 110
PEDIATRICS 616, 619 (2002).
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[I]ntersexuality constitutes a range of anatomical
conditions in which an individual's anatomy mixes key
masculine anatomy with key feminine anatomy. One quickly
runs into a problem, however, when trying to define "key" or
"essential" feminine and masculine anatomy. In fact, any close
study of sexual anatomy results in a loss of faith that there is
a simple, "natural" sex distinction that will not break down
in the face of certain anatomical, behavioral, or philosophical
challenges.
Sometimes the phrase "ambiguous genitalia" is substituted
for "intersexuality," but this does not solve the problem ...
because we still are left struggling with the question of what
must count as "ambiguous." (How small should a baby's penis
be before it counts as "ambiguous?")2"
While a thorough examination of the medical aspects and
causes of intersex conditions is far beyond the scope of this note,
a rudimentary understanding of the genetic and hormonal
influences that are responsible for normal genetic development
is necessary to appreciate the medical and legal arguments
surrounding the issue of parental consent for early gender
assignment surgery. One group of physicians explained the process
as follows:
Before about 6 weeks' gestation, male and female embryos
develop undifferentiated gonadal tissue and have primordial
structures with the potential to produce either male or female
genitalia. The genital appearance of the newborn is largely
determined by the presence or absence of genetic and hormonal
influences responsible for the active process of male
differentiation. The fetus tends to develop as a female in the
absence of these male influences. Intersex conditions arise
because of an abnormality along the male pathway that
interferes with complete masculinization or, in the case of a
genetic female, some virilizing influence that acts on the
developing embryo.
Male sexual differentiation is initiated by the SRY gene
on the short arm of the Y chromosome. Under the influence
of SRY, the undifferentiated gonad forms a testis, which
produces the hormonal milieu that results in male sexual
differentiation: testosterone stimulates the Wolffian structures
(epididymis, vas deferens, and seminal vesicles), and anti-
MUllerian hormone suppresses the development of the
23. Alice Dreger, Intersex Society of North America, "Ambiguous Sex" - or Ambivalent
Medicine? (1998), at http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency.html.
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MUllerian structures (fallopian tubes, uterus, and upper
vagina). The conversion of testosterone to dihydrotestosterone
occurs in the skin of the external genitalia and masculinizes the
external genital structures. Most of this male differentiation
takes place by about 12 weeks, after which the penis grows and
the testes descend into the scrotum. In the absence of SRY,
female sexual differentiation occurs. An error in genital
morphogenesis may occur at any step in this developmental
pathway.2 4
Intersex conditions affect approximately one out of every 2000
babies born, and pediatric surgeons perform between 100 and 200
gender assignment surgeries in the United States each year.
25
Most intersex conditions are easily identified through physical
examination at birth, although certain conditions - particularly
those involving anomalous chromosomal sexes or internal
ambiguities - can remain undetected until the child is much
older and has undergone thorough testing.26 Among the multitude
of intersex conditions, the most common include clitoromegaly
(also known as enlarged clitoris), micropenis, hypospadias,
Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS), Partial
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (PAIS), True Hermaphroditism,
and Congenital Adrenal Hylerplasia (CAH).27
The Surgical Model of Care: Historical Development and Current
State of Medical Knowledge
On June 10, 2003, the Gulf News reported that for the first
time in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), pediatric surgeons
performed gender assignment surgery on a UAE national child
born with both ovarian and testicular tissue.28 The surgery took
place at the Al Mafraq Hospital in Abu Dabi, at the hands of a
24. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Genetics, Evaluation of the Newborn
With Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 138-42 (2000)
[hereinafter Committee on Genetics].
25. Hermer, supra note 15, at 195.
26. Id. at 196.
27. Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, supra note 13.
28. Barbara Bibbo, GenderFixed forIntersex Child, GuLFNEWS, June 10, 2003, available
at LEXIS, News & Business.
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team headed by Dr. Tony Thoury.29 The child, born with a rare,
congenital intersex condition known as true hermaphroditism, was
surgically assigned to the female gender.30 Doctors predict that she
will "have a fast recovery" and "live a normal life."3'
Gender assignment surgeries may be novel to those in the
UAE, but America has long hosted these now-controversial
procedures. For the past forty years,32 pediatric surgeons in the
United States have surgically corrected intersexed infants so that
their genital and reproductive anatomies resemble that of normal
males and females.33 Only recently, as new medical findings have
been revealed and intersexed individuals have begun to speak out
against these procedures, has the surgical model of care fallen
under widespread attack.34 Before examining a parent's ability to
provide legal consent to gender assignment surgery on behalf of her
intersexed infant, it is helpful to review how and why the surgical
model of care evolved.
Gender assignment surgeries were established as the preferred
model of treatment for intersexed infants through the work of Dr.
John Money, then a clinical psychologist at Johns Hopkins Hospital
in Baltimore, Maryland.35 Dr. Money encountered a case of
identical twin baby boys, one of whom had lost his penis during a
badly-performed circumcision.36 Relying on a 'nurture' theory of
psychosexual identification, Dr. Money recommended that the
patient be surgically assigned to the female gender.37 The child
would be given female hormones to induce breast growth and other
female anatomical development, and would be raised as a girl.3"
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Patricia L. Martin, Moving Toward an International Standard in Informed Consent:
The Impact of Intersexuality and the Internet on the Standard of Care, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 135, 153 (2002).
33. Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 3.
34. See generally id. (attacking the continued performance of gender assignment surgery
on intersex infants).
35. Id. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 7-8.
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This patient, later dubbed "John/Joan" by researchers and
reporters, would soon have her story discussed in medical and
psychological journals across the world. 9 John/Joan's assignment
to the female gender would establish the surgical model of care as
the preferred model of treatment for intersexed infants. Years later,
it would provide the primary ground on which to attack this model.
Dr. Money's follow-up reports on John/Joan described the
'normal' maturation of a toddler into a well-adjusted, feminine
young girl, lending considerable support to Money's contention
that infants are psychosexual at birth and capable of adapting,
if assigned, to either gender.4" Although not born an intersexual,
John/Joan effectively served as the human test case for gender
assignment surgery on intersexed infants - a case which
reportedly "confirmed the apparent efficacy of this treatment
as a 'standard of care' for certain infants and contributed to its
wide acceptance."41
Unfortunately, the reality behind the apparent "boy-turned-
girl" success story was not nearly as rosy as Dr. Money's reports
indicated, and the important discrepancies between fact and fiction
were not publicized until years after the surgical model of care had
been established in America as the preeminent model of treatment
for intersexed infants. Contrary to the story described in Dr.
Money's reports, it was not long after surgery that John/Joan
began to show visible signs of rejecting 'her' clinical treatment plan
and assigned gender.43 Besides exhibiting "tomboyish traits,"4
John/Joan refused to cooperate in Dr. Money's counsel, was often
found standing to urinate, ran away from the hospital where she
was being treated, and even contemplated suicide.4 5 In 1997,
researchers learned that John/Joan had continued to exhibit male-
39. See generally JOHN COLAPINTA, AS NATURE MADE HIM: ThE BOY WHO WAs RAISED
AS A GIRL (2001) (detailing the widespread interest of the medical and psychological fields
in the "John/Joan" case).
40. Dreger, supra note 23.
41. Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 9.
42. See generally id. (discussing the differences between the publicized success story and
the actual failure of John/Joan's operations).
43. Id. at 8-11.
44. Id. at 8, n.20.
45. Id. at 8-10.
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like behaviors throughout childhood 46 and in 'her' early teen years
had actually rejected the female gender.47 In the years following
his public return to the male gender, John underwent mastectomies
to remove the breasts he had developed from the female hormonal
supplements he had received, and had penile constructive surgery.4"
He married a woman and adopted her three children.49 Eventually,
the two separated, and on May 4, 2004, John committed suicide.50
Risks and Drawbacks of Gender Assignment Surgery
Regrettably, a considerable number of recipients of early
gender assignment surgery have been dissatisfied with the
outcomes."' The medical and psychological literature is filled
with descriptions of the problems associated with these procedures,
including rejection of assigned gender,52 loss of reproductive
potential, loss of sexual function, loss of sexual sensation, and
physical pain during sexual activity.5" Additionally, research
conducted by the University College London (UCL) and the Great
Ormand Street Hospital for Children in London suggest that
clitoral surgery might also compromise a patient's potential to
experience sexual pleasure later in life. 4 Indeed, one study
suggests that women who had undergone clitoral surgery suffered
a thirty-nine percent greater chance that they would be unable to
achieve orgasm.55 The seriousness of these problems is heightened
because most of these procedures are irreversible: "Tissue removed
from the clitoris can never be restored; scarring produced by
surgery can never be undone."56
46. See Milton Diamond & H, Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term
Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCH. PEDIATR. ADOLESc. MED. 298, 298-304 (1997).
47. Id.
48. Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 11.
49. Diamond & Sigmundson, supra note 46, at 293-304.
50. Mireya Navarro, When Gender Isn't a Given, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2004, at Sec. 9, p. 1 .
51. Id.
52. See Phornphutkul et al., supra note 17, at 135-37.
53. Claude J. Migeon, M.D. et al.,AmbiguousGenitalia With PerineoscrotalHypospadias
in 46, XY Individuals: Long-Term Medical, Surgical, and Psychosexual Outcome, 110
PEDIATRICS 31, 31 (2002).
54. Health Newswire Reporters, "Intersex" Surgery Could Damage Sexual Function,
HEALTH NEWSWIRE CONSUMER, Apr. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News & Business.
55. Id.
56. See Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
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Support for the Surgical Model of Care: Benefits of Gender
Assignment Surgery
Both supporters and opponents of early gender assignment
surgery are pushing for more comprehensive medical and
psychological studies of these procedures, as well as for studies of
the related topics of gender identification and development, in the
hope of someday devising a more effective treatment model that will
put the whole controversy to rest.5' In the meantime, however,
numerous babies are being born with intersex conditions, and
the question remains how to best treat them. Despite the
questionable integrity of its origins and the recent public attacks on
its legality, many pediatric surgeons, psychologists, and researchers
continue to regard gender assignment surgery as an appropriate
and effective model of treatment for some intersex conditions.
Although it is impossible to ignore the staggering quantity
and severity of complications associated with gender assignment
surgery, not to mention the dearth of studies on the long-term
physical and psychological effects of these procedures," many
respected professionals nevertheless maintain that early surgery
is advisable and the benefits of gender assignment surgery often
outweigh the risks.59 Dr. A. Barry Belman, who has treated intersex
patients in his practice, is one professional who rejects the ISNA
argument that surgery should always be postponed until the
patient is old enough to provide informed consent.6° Cautioning
against waiting until the patient reaches maturity, he contends
that the question should be "settled [much earlier] for the child's
emotional welfare.""' Dr. Belman also believes that the possibility
of rejection has been grossly over-emphasized, pointing out that,
in his experience, the stories of protest over early gender
assignment surgery by former patients "represent a small group
of patients.""
Extending this line of reasoning, many prominent medical
professionals appear to agree that a legal moratorium on gender
assignment surgery would be "extreme in that the delay will
produce as many or more problems for the majority of patients as
57. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 2, at 486-88.
58. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 47.
59. Martin, supra note 32, at 154 ("Generally, physicians believe that the [intersex]
condition should be [surgically] corrected immediately.").
60. Scheck, supra note 16, at 2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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surgery in infancy creates."" As some researchers point out, a
broad moratorium on early surgery "ignores the potential for
psychosocial harm to intersex children when years pass before
decision-making is finalized, and ignores the strong deference in
our culture to parental discretion in decisions for and about their
children."6 Echoing this opinion is Dr. Kenneth I. Glassberg, a
pediatric urologist who emphasizes the significant number of
intersexuals who are happy with their early surgery and points
out the likely possibility that if the law bans gender assignment
surgery, intersex children with ambiguous genitalia will "be
considered freaks by their classmates."6 ' Dr. Glassberg opposes
the institution of a legal moratorium on these procedures, noting
that such a moratorium "is itself experimental, and more of an
experiment [than the procedures].
The British Association of Pediatric Surgeons Working Party
on the Surgical Management of Children Born With Ambiguous
Genitalia also opposes the imposition of a moratorium on early
gender assignment surgery.67 Psychologist Heino Meyer-Bahlburg
reports that "[miany patients are quite traditional and are content
with their own early surgery."" Other physicians, including
University of Pittsburgh Professor of Pediatrics, Peter Lee, M.D.,
share this sentiment: "My experience suggests that many, if not
most, of the people who had surgery as infants are pleased .... "
In spite of its many problems and contrary to the assertions of
many moratorium opponents, it appears that the surgical model of
treatment has enjoyed a substantial measure of success, and is
supported by respected empirical studies.7" Additionally, evidence
exists to suggest that the success rate of gender assignment surgery
may increase with the advent of new surgical techniques.71 Indeed,
surgical advances have already rectified some of the problems
presently complained of by dissatisfied patients who underwent
surgery years ago. "Current techniques that were not possible 30-35
years ago now can maintain nerves and sensitivity of the organs,
and some experimental evidence shows that sensitivity may be
63. Blizzard, supra note 22, at 618 (internal quotations omitted).
64. Id. at 619 (citing Daaboul and Frader).
65. Barron H. Lerner, If Biology Is Destiny, When Shouldn't It Be?, N. Y. TIMES, May 27,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/27/health/psychology/27BEHA.html.
66. Id.
67. Blizzard, supra note 22 at 618 (reporting the Association's position).
68. Id.
69. Lee & Gruppuso, supra note 12, at 2.
70. Migeon, supra note 53, at 31.
71. Martin, supra note 32, at 159-60.
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preserved." 2 Recognizing the proven and potential merits of early
surgery, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued a statement
in July 2000 advocating the use of a "team" approach for the
treatment ofintersexed infants, one that leaves open the possibility
of early gender assignment surgery. 3
Before surgically assigning a gender to an intersexed infant,
pediatric surgeons consider many factors, including the following:
the infant's capacity for normal sexual function, the reproductive
potential, endocrine function, potential for malignant change in
sexual organs, androgen imprinting of the brain, 4 and potential
to have normal-looking genitalia. 75 Traditionally, phallus size
has also been considered a significant factor when determining
the gender to which an intersexed infant should be assigned.76
Surgeons, however, are beginning to deemphasize this factor in
the process of gender assignment, recognizing that its importance
has been largely exaggerated.7
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed Consent Doctrine
To escape being labeled a battery, a non-emergency surgical
procedure must be performed with the implied or express consent
of the patient.7' To be legally effective, this consent must be
adequately "informed."79 The informed consent doctrine allows a
patient to make his or her own medical decisions" and safeguards
"the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."8 '
72. Id.
73. Committee on Genetics, supra note 24 at 142.
74. Interview with Hossein Aliabadi, supra note 13.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Del. 1999) (holding that a
doctor who performs surgery under normal circumstances, without the consent of the subject,
commits a battery).
79. See Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980).
80. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 34 (internal citations omitted).
81. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health et al., 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)
quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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Informed consent doctrine requires physicians to actively
involve the patient in the consent process 2 and to disclose
information that is relevant to the patient's medical treatment.8
Generally, a physician "must fully explain the proposed procedure,
the expected short-term risks and long-term consequences, the
available alternatives and their risks and benefits and the
consequences of declining or delaying treatment."84 As one legal
scholar explained:
[Informed consent includes an obligation to provide relevant
information concerning alternatives to the proposed treatment,
including "material risks incident to abstention from treatment."
Although some courts continue to follow an older physician-
oriented standard and measure the adequacy of disclosure with
reference to the custom and standard within the medical
community, the decisional trend over the past two decades has
been toward a patient-oriented standard, with reference to
"what a reasonable person objectively needs to hear from his or
her physician to allow the patient to make an informed and
intelligent decision regarding proposed medical treatment."8 5
In addition to the duty of disclosure, informed consent doctrine
imposes a duty on physicians to ensure that the consent for
medical treatment is being received from an individual legally
capable of giving consent. To be considered legally capable of
giving informed consent to a particular treatment, the individual
must have the capacity to appreciate all of the treatment's
important aspects, including its potential consequences.8 6 In cases
involving incompetent minors, public policy usually demands that
82. J. Steven Svoboda et al., Informed Consent for Neonatal Circumcision: An Ethical and
Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 61, 65(2000).
83. Courts have reluctantly recognized some exceptions to the disclosure requirement,
such as waiver and therapeutic privilege. See generally Canturbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
84. Svoboda et al., supra note 82, at 67 n.34.
85. Beh & Diamond, supra note 3, at 35 (internal citations omitted). See also Ross
Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of
Normal, Healthy Tissue From Their Infant Children?: The Practice of Circumcision in the
United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 99 (1998/1999) (stating "courts
measure informed consent either by the disclosure that would have been given by a
reasonable physician, typically measured by the customary practices of physicians in the
locality, or by a standard based upon disclosure of information which the patient would deem
relevant in reaching a decision. The latter 'patient-based' rule reflects the trend towards a
healthy skepticism of medical authority, and the increasing recognition of patients' right to
control their own treatment"(internal citations omitted)).
86. Svoboda et al., supra note 82, at 70-71.
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medical professionals obtain consent from the minor patient's
parent or guardian before administering treatment.87
Additionally, physicians have a duty to ensure that consent is
given voluntarily. To be voluntary, a patient's decision concerning
whether to pursue a given form of medical treatment should be free
of coercion, manipulation, and improper influences." Numerous
factors can interfere with the voluntariness of a patient's treatment
decision, including the natural power imbalance between physician
and patient, the physician's tendencies to highlight treatments that
follow his personal preferences while downplaying those that
do not, and the poor timing of the physician's disclosure of
treatment considerations.8 9
Suggestions That the Conditions for Informed Consent May Not
Always Be Met in Cases of Early Gender Assignment Surgery:
Fatal to the Surgical Model of Care?
Barriers to informed consent often exist when "[a]ctivists and
others who have examined the issue note that cosmetic and sex
assignment surgeries on intersex children are frequently performed
without adequate disclosure, and under rushed circumstances
which are not conducive to careful or thoughtful deliberation."0
Based on such reports, opponents of gender assignment surgery
often argue that the likelihood that certain elements of informed
consent have not been met warrants a moratorium.9 1 One author
writes that "[tihe questionable theoretical bases for early genital-
normalizing surgery are rarely, if ever, disclosed to the parents
of intersexed infants."" The failure to disclose these bases,
together with other deceptions by doctors who routinely advocate
87. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
88. Svoboda et al., supra note 82, at 71.
89. Id. at 71-72.
90. Hermer, supra note 15, at 220.
91. Ford, supra note 2, at 488.
92. Id. at 486.
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early genital-normalizing surgery,93 ostensibly renders it impossible
for parents to give legal informed consent to gender assignment
surgery.94 These critics of surgery contend that because there have
been relatively few scientific studies on the long-term effects of
gender assignment surgery, "the potential risks of genital-
normalizing surgery cannot be communicated to the parents of
intersexed infants."9 5 Additionally, surgical critics claim that a
doctor's tendency to identify the course of treatment that he
believes is in the best interests of the infant might constitute
"coercion" if the parents are guided by this advice.9 6 Furthermore,
these critics counsel that the sense of vulnerability and devastation
that parents sometimes experience after the birth of an intersexed
child would make it virtually impossible for them to comprehend
the information necessary for them to grant informed consent to
gender assignment surgery.97
It is undoubtedly true that "physicians need to present the
options available to parents [of intersexed infants] in a neutral
and inclusive fashion,"98 and "parents need early psychological
counseling and support."9 The unwillingness or inability of some
physicians to properly inform the parents of intersexed children
of the benefits and risks of gender assignment surgery, however,
and the inability of some parents to adequately appreciate the
ramifications of early surgery, should not be used to prove that
informed consent is impossible and that a moratorium on gender
assignment surgery is the only solution. Concerns that could be
addressed by increasing the information given to the parents of
intersexed infants and referring them to family counseling should
not be addressed with a moratorium on the surgeries. Phrased
93. Hermer, supra note 15, at 222-23. Hermer writes:
[H]ealth care providers often convey an aura of urgency regarding sex
assignment and cosmetic genital surgeries that is not medically or surgically
justified. Information concerning the surgeries is frequently incomplete,
particularly issues concerning the cosmetic outcome and potential effects of
scarring on future sexual sensation. Secrecy concerning the surgeries has been
fostered in the past, particularly with respect to what the intersex child does or
does not know about them. [Researchers] also note that physicians have
frequently failed to disclose the possibility that the child will ultimately reject
the sex to which the surgery will assign him or her ....
Id.
94. Ford, supra note 2, at 486.
95. Id. at 487 (emphasis added). See also Martin, supra note 32, at 161-62 (adding that
follow-up studies of intersexuals have not been conducted).
96. Ford, supra note 2, at 487.
97. Id. at 488.
98. Hermer, supra note 15, at 231.
99. Id. at 232-33.
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differently, there is no need to use a tourniquet when a band-aid
would stop the bleeding. As one scholar pointed out:
There undoubtedly have been, and may still be, serious
informed consent issues with many intersex surgeries on
infants. This is not, however, a basis on which one can
reasonably call for a moratorium on the surgeries, particularly
when one can take the less drastic step of offering more
complete information (e.g., indicating gaps in information,
such as those concerning long-term outcomes)."°
Additionally, those opposed to allowing families to make
medical decisions for incompetent patients often point out that
families may inappropriately choose or deny treatment options
out of their own desire to be relieved of the emotional and social
burdens of coping with an ailing relative.' Not surprisingly,
these arguments have been extended to the arena of early gender
assignment surgery.' °2
If a parent's aim in providing consent for early gender
assignment surgery was only to obtain relief from the emotional
and social burdens of coping with an intersexed child, there would
be a much faster, albeit harsher, solution available: adoption. The
parents of an intersexed infant always have the option of
effectively "walking away" from the entire situation, leaving their
infant to the care of someone more able or willing to manage the
complications associated with an intersexed child.'0 3 It follows
that, when parents provide consent to gender assignment surgery,
after being informed of the various risks and benefits of surgery
as well as the different medical and psychological aspects of their
infant's particular intersex condition, they do so out of concern for
their child, in an attempt to safeguard their child's best interests.
100. Id. at 223.
101. Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws:A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills
and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 152-53 (1993).
102. See Ford, supra note 2, at 488.
103. Hamann, supra note 101, at 153 (noting that "if the family's goal in terminating
treatment is to be relieved of the financial and emotional hardships associated with the
person's illness, they have a much easier way out. They can just walk away. (For example,
Mr. and Mrs. Cruzan could have deserted their daughter like Nancy's husband did ....
When a family tries to terminate treatment, they do it out of love")).
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Legal Tradition of Deference to Parents in the Treatment of Their
Incompetent Minor Children
Courts have long stressed that "the parental right is sacred
which can be invaded for only the most compelling reasons."14
Consequently, parents are widely respected as being in the best
position to make decisions involving the education and upbringing
of their children,"' and America enjoys a strong tradition of
deference to parental wishes in the context of medical care for
minor children.10 6 This tradition is premised on the notion that
"parents, as the natural guardians of their children, are best
situated and best able to make important decisions on their
behalf."0 7 Protected by statute in many states, the parental ability
to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their minor children
has long been supported by the Supreme Court, and it remains in
effect even when medical treatment imposes risks on the child. As
the Court stated in Parham v. J.R., "[slimply because the decision
of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks
does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision
from the parents to some agency or officer of the state .... Parents
can and must make those judgments."0" The law generally assumes
that parents typically act to protect their children's welfare, and it
allows broad parental discretion in treatment decisions, absent a
termination of parental rights or a particular showing that the
treatment will be detrimental to the child. 9 Explaining the
104. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991). See also In re Burns, 519 A.2d
638, 645 (Del. 1986) (holding due process needs to be satisfied with termination of parental
rights); Daber v. Div. of Child Protective Serv., 470 A.2d 723, 726 (Del. 1983) (holding that
clear and convincing evidence is needed for parental right termination).
105. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish
parents to control the education and upbringing of their children); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 532-33 (1925) (recognizing parental right to control education and religious
teaching of their children). See also Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to
Determine When Parents Should Make Health Care Decisions for their Children: Is Deference
Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 4 (2000) (discussing the constitutional right of parents to make
health care decisions for their children).
106. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Bryan Shartle, Comment,
Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the Increasing Number of Living Organ and
Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REV. 433 (2001) (stating the need for legislation in
organ donations by minors).
107. Ford, supra note 2, at 478 (citations omitted); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary fimction and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.").
108. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
109. Id. at 602.
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rationale behind this respect of parental authority, the Parham
Court declared:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children." °
This deference to parents, well-grounded in reason and tradition, has
since formed the basis for judicial recognition of the parents' right to
consent to medical procedures on behalf of their minor children.
Parental Consent for Minor Children
Infants are inherently incapable of personally providing legal
consent to gender assigmnent surgeries because of their inability to
weigh the benefits and risks of various forms of medical treatment
and comprehend the ramifications of surgical procedures."'
Consequently, if an infant is to undergo a gender assignment
procedure, informed consent will have to be provided by an
individual other than the infant patient. Usually, the parent or
guardian provides this consent."2 When determining whether
parental consent is legally sufficient to allow an incompetent minor
child to undergo a surgical procedure, American courts typically
rely on the "substituted judgment" standard,"' the "best interests"
standard,"4 or some combination of the two.
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND BEST INTERESTS TESTS
The Substituted Judgment Standard
The substituted judgment standard, first employed in a 'right-
to-die' case,"' is a subjective test that purportedly takes into
account "each individual person's desires and personal value
system. The goal of substituted judgment is to determine, insofar as
possible, what the incompetent person would have decided if
110. Id.
111. Ford, supra note 2, at 477-78.
112. Id.
113. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387-90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
114. In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
115. Hamann, supra note 101, at 111.
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he were competent."11 The doctrine of substituted judgment allows
a third party, such as a parent, to legally advocate the course of
action that is in the best interest of the incompetent minor. 7 A
minor patient's parents, as surrogates for the patient, must "decide
not on the basis of how they want the patient to be treated, but
rather on the basis of how the patient would choose to be treated if
he or she were capable of choosing."11
The difficulty with applying the substituted judgment standard
to cases involving intersexed infants is that infants are incapable
of expressing their treatment preferences in any dependable and
meaningful way. Indeed, infants have never once been capable of
expressing treatment preferences. Consequently, it is virtually
impossible to predict whether a particular intersexed infant would
have chosen gender assignment surgery had he or she been
competent."9 Some commentators have avoided this philosophical
dilemma by suggesting that, in cases where there is little evidence
of how the patient would choose to be treated if he or she were
capable of choosing, as in the case of an intersexed infant, the
substituted judgment standard calls on the surrogate to make the
treatment decision on the basis of how a rational patient would
choose to be treated under the totality of the circumstances. 2 °
Under this reasoning, the subjective "substituted judgment"
standard seems to meld into the more objective "best interests"
standard2 1 that courts often use when evaluating parents' decisions
concerning the medical treatment of incompetent minors.
122
116. Id.
117. Ford, supra note 2, at 477-78.
118. Svoboda et a]., supra note 82, at 76.
119. Hamann, supra note 101, at 112-13 (noting the great difficulty in applying the
substituted judgment standard to patients "who were never able to express a preference,
namely minors and the mentally handicapped").
120. Svoboda et al., supra note 82, at 77.
121. The overlap between the two standards is apparent: acting on behalf of the patient,
the parent surrogate chooses the treatment decision that a rational patient would choose
under the circumstances (substituted judgment analysis), which presumably is the treatment
that would best serve the patient's interests (best interests analysis).
122. See Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 753 (Mass. District 1978). The court
recognized that "iun a case... involving a child who is incompetent by reason of his tender
years, we think that the substituted judgment doctrine is consistent with the 'best interests
of the child' test . . . As a practical matter, the criteria to be examined and the basic
applicable reasoning are the same." Id.
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The Best Interests Standard
Most courts employ the objective best interests standard when
outlining the scope of medical treatments for which parents may
legally consent on behalf of their incompetent minor children.'2 3
Under the best interests approach, a parent's capacity to make
decisions for the welfare of the child may be limited when those
decisions adversely affect the child's health and well-being.124 A
parent may only consent to those procedures that are objectively
in the child's best interests.12 These interests have been defined as
those involving "relief from suffering, preservation or restoration of
functioning, and quality and extent of sustained life."126 "Although
the court in such determinations considers both the attendant risks
and benefits of various alternatives, personal preferences do not
weigh heavily, if at all, in a best interests determination."2 7 Under
the best interests standard, courts perform a balancing test that
weighs the costs and risks of the proposed treatment against its
likely benefits. 128
Difficulties With Applying the Substituted Judgment and Best
Interest Standards to Cases of Early Gender Assignment Surgery,
and Arguments for Why Parental Involvement in Treatment
Decisions Might Minimize These Difficulties
As identified in the preceding section, one main difficulty in
applying the substituted judgment standard to cases involving early
gender assignment surgery is that infants are unable to express a
treatment preference. Indeed, it is doubtful whether infants are
able to express any sort of feelings or tendencies to help indicate
which treatment decision they might make if they were competent.
Even in jurisdictions that do not explicitly adopt a best interests
approach to cases involving medical care for incompetent minors,
the substituted judgment standard strongly resembles the best
123. Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal, Using ScientificAdvances to Conceive the "Perfect"Donor:
The Pandora's Box of Creating Child Donors for the Purpose of Saving Ailing Family
Members, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 583, 606 (2002) ("The American legal system subsequently
adopted the 'best interests' standard, which 'remains the governing principle for adjudicating
cases involving minors.") (internal citations omitted).
124. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that parents are not "free
... to make martyrs of their children").
125. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
126. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
127. Sankoorikal, supra note 123, at 606 (internal citations omitted).
128. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981).
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interests standard. Accordingly, treatment decisions for intersexed
infants should be made on the assumption that an intersexed infant
would have chosen the treatment option best promoting his or
her interests.
The primary problem with using this approach in situations
involving intersexed infants, is that the medical community has
not developed one correct medical model for the treatment of
these infants.'29 There is grave uncertainty as to which form of
treatment most effectively promotes the intersexed infant's best
interests. The longstanding, predominant surgical model of care
has been widely criticized for its dubious scientific foundation.
Nevertheless, no other model has yet been established to take
its place. Anecdotal evidence certainly suggests that intersexed
infants can grow into happy, psychologically well-adjusted
individuals without undergoing early surgery.3 ' There is also
considerable evidence to suggest that the surgical model of care is
an effective and valuable treatment model, and that the recipients
of early surgery are generally happy with their results.' 3 ' An
'objective' best interests standard presupposes a consensus in
society on the issue of whether an intersexed infant should undergo
gender assignment surgery, when in fact there is great controversy
surrounding the matter.
In the clear absence of a'best' form of treatment, any treatment
decision made for an intersexed infant will necessarily reflect the
decision-maker's value system. The decision-maker must first take
all of the available evidence into account, weighing the physical,
emotional, psychological, and social risks of early surgery against
its potential physical, emotional, psychological, and social benefits.
The decision-maker must then decide whether gender assignment
surgery is appropriate in the particular case before him. Given the
relative lack of long-term evidence about intersexed individuals
who were not surgically altered in their early years, the decision
not to operate is as much a treatment decision and an
'experiment' as the decision to operate - if not more so. The
129. See Beh and Diamond, supra note 3, at 34-42.
130. See Intersex Babies, supra note 11.
131. See Lerner, supra note 65.
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experiment is simply cultural in nature, rather than surgical.'32
As two notable scholars explained,
there is very little data suggesting that parents can (or, for
that matter, cannot) raise children with ambiguous genitalia
unambiguously in one gender. There is similarly little data
concerning how well intersex children interact with their
peers during adolescence, when ambiguities are likely to come
to light in gym class and elsewhere (if they have not already
done so). Children are particularly hard on those whom they
perceive to be different.'33
Rather than take this difficult decision away from the parents
and physicians through the imposition of a legal moratorium on
gender assignment surgeries, it would seem more prudent to allow
those closest to the infant to make the decision that appears most
likely to benefit the infant overall. The parents of an intersexed
infant, together with the infant's family and physicians, have the
greatest knowledge about the particular intersex condition from
which the infant suffers, the specific cultural and religious
environment in which the infant will be raised, the social
community in which the infant will develop, and other relevant
factors. Therefore, parents are in the best position to determine
what treatment, if any, the intersexed infant would have chosen, as
well as the treatment option that is in the overall best interests of
the infant. To the extent that personal values are reflected in this
difficult treatment decision, the decision should reflect the
individualized values of those closest to the infant - those who will
have the primary responsibility for the infant's upbringing and
132. Hermer, supra note 15, at 228. Hermer writes:
It must be recognized that, if we choose the latter course [of delaying surgery
or bypassing it altogether], we will again have used intersex individuals as
guinea pigs of sorts, this time in a cultural experiment. However much any of
us may wish to see [this latter course of delaying surgery] prevail, the outcome
is not certain. Thus, a physician cannot, in good conscience, assure the parents
of an intersex infant that they ought not to choose cosmetic or sex assignment
surgery for their child, on the ground that the unaltered child, along with
his/her intersexual forebears and brethren, will (over time) alter our present
sex and gender systems to make space for those who do not conform to the
present norms. Given our present state of knowledge concerning the long-term
outcomes of intersex individuals (both those who have and have not had
surgery), and given our current sex and gender systems and the fact that
intersex individuals have no choice but to cope with them one way or another,
there can presently be no reasonably certain "right" answer for physicians and
parents of intersex children with respect to surgery.
Id.
133. Id. at 233.
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value system - as opposed to the impersonal "value" that a
uniform, blanket moratorium would impose.
BENEFITS OF EARLY GENDER ASSIGNMENT SURGERY
Early Gender Assignment Surgery as Experimental and Not
Medically Indicated: Whom Does Surgery Benefit?
In general, "[miost courts . . . defer to parental discretion
within a broad spectrum of situations ranging from those which
are medically necessary, to those which do not threaten the health
of the child."' When parents seek to provide consent on behalf
of their children for treatments that appear experimental or outside
the realm of medical indication, however, courts often intervene
if the desired treatment does not appear to confer an independent
benefit on the child.'35 Advocates of a moratorium on gender
assignment surgery allege that parental consent is not sufficient
for early gender assignment surgeries because these surgeries
involve "experimental techniques which must not be imposed
without the patient's full informed consent."136 Emphasizing the
strong American tradition against subjecting involuntary human
subjects to experimental medical procedures, organizations such
as the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) argue that the
experimental nature of gender assignment surgeries prohibits
their performance on intersexed infants.'37
These opponents of gender assignment surgeries allege that
such procedures are unrelated to the health of an intersexed child
and unnecessary for the child's survival or function.' Arguing
that these surgeries fail to meet the requirement that an
experimental treatment offer independent benefit to the patient,3 9
moratorium advocates contend that the only real benefits of early
surgery are realized by the parents of intersexed infants, and not
by the infants themselves. 40 Considering the flexible manner in
which the courts have previously measured "independent benefit,"
however, it appears that the potential psychological and cultural
134. Povenmire, supra note 85, at 105-06.
135. See generally, Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (recognizing the
"basic consideration" that an operation performed on a minor provide some benefit to the
minor himself).
136. Amicus Brief, supra note 4. See also Ford, supra note 2, at 486-88.
137. Amicus Brief, supra note 4.
138. See id.
139. Ford, supra note 2, at 480-82.
140. Amicus Brief, supra note 4.
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benefits offered by gender assignment surgery warrant its inclusion
among the surgical procedures offering independent benefit to the
patient. In addition to the direct psychological benefits that may
accompany gender assignment procedures, surgery may also
bring intersexuals, their families, and their peers closer together,
allowing intersexuals to grow up in happier home and cultural
environments.' "[If surgery permits those parents to better
relate to their child, then both the parents and the child will have
benefited from it, notwithstanding any ill effects the surgery may
ultimately have on the child him/herself."' Clearly, sufficient
evidence exists to suggest that intersexed infants can receive
independent benefit from gender assignment surgery, and often
do. Accordingly, courts should recognize parents as having the
legal capacity to consent to early surgery on behalf of their
intersexed infants.
In Strunk v. Strunk, the Supreme Court of Kentucky modified
the substituted judgment standard to uphold parents' right to
consent to their twenty-seven-year-old, mentally-disabled son's
donation of a kidney to his brother. The court reasoned that the
boy would probably be more traumatized by losing his brother
than by undergoing a kidney transplant procedure. 4 ' Using
comparable analysis, the Superior Court of Connecticut upheld
the right of parents to consent to their daughter's donation of a
kidney to her twin sister in Hart v. Brown. The court noted that
"the donor would enjoy a better future life if her ailing twin sister
were kept alive""' and declared that the parents "have the right
. . . to give their consent to the operations on both minor
children."'4 5 Similarly, in Little v. Little, the Texas Court of
Appeals sanctioned the removal of a kidney from an incompetent
individual suffering from Down's Syndrome, basing its decision on
the "strong evidence ... that [the donor] will receive substantial
141. See Hermer, supra note 15, at 230 (suggesting that delaying surgery may cause
parents and peers to bond poorly with an intersex child, due to the child's malformed
genitals).
142. Id. at 235.
143. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969); see also Sankoorikal, supra note
123, at 609 (reporting the court's statement as, "[u]nder a strict reading of the 'substituted
judgment' standard, considerations of benefit to the incompetent are not appropriate"). It
cited Strunk as an example of a case in which a court, under the auspices of a substituted
judgment standard, reached a decision based partly on the objective benefit to the patient
and thus modified the substituted judgment standard to resemble the best interests
standard. Id.
144. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
145. Id. at 391.
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psychological benefits from [the procedure]."146 Even with all
the medical risks inherent to organ donation procedures, the
courts in these cases reasoned that the kidney donors would
probably suffer less harm in undergoing the surgeries than
they would in losing their siblings.'4 7 While emphasizing the
importance of minimizing the expected harm to minor children
undergoing medical treatment, the Strunk and Hart courts
remained flexible in outlining the factors considered when
measuring the harm and benefit to the child.1"s Employing a broad
view of "harm," the courts placed great emphasis on the child's
potential to suffer psychological damage and the psychological value
of the child's personal relationships.14 9
The argument that gender assignment surgery is "unrelated
to an intersexed infant's health"'5 ° reflects a severely limited
understanding of human "health," and ignores the courts'
longstanding liberal treatment of the term. For decades, courts
have employed reasoning similar to that used in the Strunk and
Hart decisions, incorporating psychological and emotional factors
when analyzing the effects of surgical procedures on an individual's
health and well-being. In so doing, these courts acknowledged that
the term "health" is not limited to the physical and physiological
workings of an individual's body, but includes the individual's
mental health and development as well.
One famous example of a liberal judicial view of health is found
in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, in which the Supreme Court
broadly construed the term "health" to incorporate an individual's
psychological and emotional well-being.'5 1 The Court stated,
"[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
146. Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
147. See cases cited supra notes 143-45.
148. The judicial conception of "benefit" is often further relaxed in situations in which
considerable debate exists in the medical community about the efficacy and appropriateness
of various medical treatments. For instance, in cases of minors caught in a persistent
vegetative state, courts usually trust parents to make decisions about removing life-
sustaining treatment The more tenuous the judgment call, the more likely a minor's parents
will be allowed to make that call free of legal constraints. Indeed, parents will almost always
be allowed to make "wrenching health care decisions when there is no social consensus as
to appropriate treatment." Rosato, supra note 105, at 65.
149. Notably, several courts have looked to the impact of surgery on a minor's emotional
and mental health when upholding the sterilization of minor children. See, e.g., In re C.D.M.,
627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981); see also In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence did not establish the ward's incompetency).
150. See Amicus Brief, supra note 4.
151. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child."152 The Supreme Court's emphasis on the mental health and
distress of the mother outlines an expansive definition of health;
one that places great importance on the emotional well-being of
the individual. Under this view, it is apparent that early gender
assignment surgery, with its potential to improve a patient's
emotional wellness and happiness,153 can offer significant health
benefits to an intersexed individual and should not be banned
through the imposition of a legal moratorium.
Gender Assignment Surgery as Merely 'Cosmetic?'
Labeling a childhood surgery 'cosmetic' does not automatically
place it outside the bounds for which parents may lawfully
consent.l" Nevertheless, characterizing gender assignment surgery
as 'cosmetic ' 55 can trivialize this intensely significant procedure.
That label ignores the immense impact that gender assignment
surgery can have on an intersexed infant's psychological and
emotional health, as well as the infant's mental development
and process of gender-identification. Furthermore, labeling these
surgeries as 'cosmetic' threatens to mischaracterize a procedure
that falls well within the Supreme Court's conception of 'health' and
medically-indicated surgeries. This opinion is echoed by Dr. Peter
Lee, who argues that gender assignment surgery should properly
be considered corrective surgery, and not cosmetic surgery.156 He
admits that the distinction between the two can often be subtle, but
stresses its importance.' According to Dr. Lee, cosmetic surgery
is surgery that is performed "just so that the organ has a more
pleasing appearance," such as mammoplasty to make a 'normally'-
152. Id. at 153 (1973). This focus on psychological and emotional harm was echoed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (stating that "[t]he mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only
she must bear").
153. Martin, supra note 32, at 168 (Parents ofintersexed infants "should be warned about
the repercussions of waiting until [puberty]" for gender assignment surgery and "parents
should also know that untreated ambiguous genitalia may create problems for children when
they attend school, resulting in serious psychological repercussions").
154. For instance, in the case of circumcision, parents are "presumed to have the power
to consent . . . despite the mounting evidence of the procedure's deleterious effects."
Povenmire, supra note 85, at 106.
155. See Intersex Society of North America, at http://www.isna.org; see also Lee &
Gruppuso, supra note 12 (describing the difference between cosmetic and corrective surgery).
156. Lee & Gruppuso, supra note 12.
157. Id.
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developed woman's breasts more symmetrical.15 In contrast,
mammoplasty for a young man with persistent gynecomastia 59
is better characterized as corrective surgery, 6 ° similar to the way
that a cleft palate is corrected both to improve function as well as
to minimize the abnormal appearance of the condition.
In In re Kevin Sampson, the Court of Appeals of New York
directed and authorized surgery and blood transfusions on a
fifteen-year-old child over his mother's religious objections, even
though surgery was not required to improve the physical health
or life of the child or the public. 6' The child suffered from Von
Recklinghausen's disease, which caused a "massive deformity of
the right side of his face and neck" that the court described as "a
large fold or flap of an overgrowth of facial tissue which causes
the whole cheek, the corner of his mouth and right ear to drop
down giving him an appearance which can only be described as
grotesque and repulsive." 16 2 The court recognized that the condition
posed no immediate threat to the boy's sight and hearing, and
that the main, and perhaps the only, benefit that surgery would
offer was psychological and cultural." 3 Nevertheless, the court
found that this benefit was great enough to justify surgery. The
court stated,
there is ... no need for treatment of either his eyes or his ears.
However, the massive deformity of the entire right side of his
face and neck is patently so gross and so disfiguring that it must
inevitably exert a most negative effect upon his personality
development, his opportunity for education and later
employment and upon every phase of his relationship with his
peers and others.'"
The treating psychologist reported that the child showed "no
evidence of any thinking disorder and . . . failed to show any
158. Id.
159. Gynecomastia is a medical condition that results in "abnormally large breasts
on men," Merle James Yost, Gynecomastia in Men: What is Gynecomastia?, at
http://www.gynecomastia.org/content/general/gynart.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
Potential causes of gynecomastia include: puberty, steroid abuse, obesity, tumors, genetic
disorders, chronic liver disease, marijuana use, castration, Klinefelter Syndrome, Gilbert's
Syndrome, and aging. Id.
160. Id. (stating that often the best solution is surgery).
161. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970).
162. Id. at 643.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 644.
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outstanding personality aberration.""' One of the attending
surgeons described the procedure as "dangerous" and testified
that it involved "considerable risk."166 Nevertheless, the court
determined that the possibility of normalizing the child's
appearance through surgery would have a profound effect on the
child's psychological and emotional well-being.16 The court
stated that "the conclusion is inescapable that the marked facial
disfigurement from which this boy suffers constitutes such an
overriding limiting factor militating against his future development
that unless some constructive steps are taken to alleviate his
condition," he would have less chance of successfully pursuing a
"normal, useful life.""6 Claiming broad authority to "help safeguard
[children's] physical, mental, and emotional well-being," the court
ordered risky, corrective medical treatment for the child.'69 The
court understood that the beneficial effect that this 'cosmetic'
surgery might have on the child's mental and emotional health
was important enough to not just sanction the procedure in
accordance with the parent's wishes, but indeed to order the
procedure against the parent's wishes.
170
Similar to the aesthetic correction of the child's deformity
in Sampson, gender assignment surgery affords intersexed
infants the opportunity to benefit psychologically from corrective
surgery, potentially increasing their "chances for a normal,
useful life."171 Under this view, which is consistent with the
broad judicial conception of health exemplified by Roe, gender
assignment surgery is not merely cosmetic, but is integrally
related to the individual's health and medical interests, and should
be treated accordingly.
PARENTAIIMEDICAL VS. JUDICIAJ/LEGAL DECISION MAKING
Parents and Doctors Are Often Better Able to Make Medical
Decisions than Courts and Legislatures
165. Id.
166. Id. at 645.
167. Id. at 644.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 647 (quoting FAM. CT. ACT. §1011).
170. In In re Sampson, the child's mother actually authorized the corrective surgery, but
refused to authorize the blood transfusions without which the surgery would be so risky that
it could not be performed. Id. at 643. See also In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80 (1955) (recognizing
the court's authority to direct surgery on a child's cleft palate and harelip, based on its
authority to protect the child's general welfare, when the primary health benefits of surgery
were psychological and mental in nature).
171. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
YOU MAKE ME FEEL LIKE A NATURAL WOMAN
Ardath A. Hamann is a critic of society's reluctance to allow
families to withhold life-sustaining treatment from incompetent
adult relatives. He writes:
Society justifies interference with family decisionmaking on
the basis that children must be protected . .. or under the
theory that family members have a conflict of interest ...
Instead, society concludes, the omniscient and impartial
outsider should make the decision. This conclusion is
fundamentally flawed. Only God is omniscient and there is no
absolute truth ... There are only individual preferences based
in individual morality.
7 2
Legislators and judges are often no more impartial than family
members in making medical decisions on behalf of incompetent
patients, and they are frequently less qualified to make these
decisions. 7 ' Therefore, although society does not always agree
with every medical decision made by a patient's family, one could
infer that families are generally better decisionmakers than the
existing alternatives." 4 As one scholar pointed out:
Some of the common concerns with judges as decision-makers
are that the judicial process takes too long, judges do not know
the patient or her situation well enough, and they possess their
own set of biases. Even more significantly, judges cannot weigh
the moral and ethical considerations that are integral to these
decisions .... "'
These concerns are easily extended to legislators and to
virtually anyone outside of the patient's immediate circle of
contact: hospital administrative boards, ethical committees, and
the like. Admittedly, these 'outside' individuals and organizations
might be sufficiently knowledgeable and impartial to play an
influential role in the decisionmaking process. It would be horribly
172. Hamann, supra note 101, at 139-40.
173. Sankoorikal, supra note 123, at 602. Sankoorikal writes:
With respect to the legal system, in particular, judicial intervention in parental
decisions has often been criticized on the theory that courts and judges lack the
time or knowledge needed to render an informed decision in the child's best
interests. In addition, these non-familial decision-makers are often unable to
weigh non-quantifiable factors such as the myriad moral and ethical
considerations that may affect a particular family.
Id. (internal citations omitted),
174. See Rosato, supra note 105, at 42.
175. Id.
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inappropriate, however, to allow them to rob the parents of
intersexed infants of any participation in the decision regarding
gender assignment surgery by instituting a legal moratorium on
such surgery.
Another consideration weighing against a moratorium is that
"[miedical decisionmaking for an incompetent person should rest
with the person's family because no one loves the person more
than his own family."176 An intersexed infant typically receives the
most concern from his or her family: family members spend time
with the infant, assist with the infant's care and comfort, and
advocate on the infant's behalf.' Additionally, the parents of
intersexed infants will themselves have to live with the treatment
decisions made on behalf of their child, 7 ' and they are usually
in the best position to understand and help their child face the
unique difficulties and challenges that accompany his or her
intersex condition and treatment. These and many other reasons
often warrant deference to parents. 1
79
As discussed earlier, the substituted judgment test was created
in an effort to arrive at an outcome consistent with an incompetent
patient's wishes.' Obviously, an intersexed infant lacks the
cognitive ability to form preferences regarding medical treatment,
much less to communicate them in a dependable fashion.
Nevertheless, an intersexed infant's parents would probably be
familiar and sensitive to the environment and considerations that
would control the infant's treatment preferences. To the extent
that the substituted judgment or best interests standards are
appropriate for these cases, society should allow the informed and
involved parent - and not the uninformed and uninvolved force of
the law - to make the uniquely personal surgical decision for the
intersexed infant. 181
Different Children, Different Needs
The need for parental deference in treatment decisions for
incompetent minors is particularly acute in cases where the
176. Hamann, supra note 101, at 160.
177. Id. at 162 (discussing in terms of"families" and "patients").
178. Id.
179. Rosato, supra note 105, at 51.
180. Hamann, supra note 101, at 164.
181. See Rosato, supra note 105, at 42-44 (stating that the moral authority of parents to
make fundamental health care decisions for their infant children "directly serves the
patient's interests, as long as the interests of a patient whose family does not reflect this
reality is adequately protected").
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patient's treatment preference is unknown or unknowable, and
medical opinion is divided." 2 As one scholar explained:
VTihe decision-maker must not only 'do good' in a general
sense, but must do the particular 'patient's' good. This task is
made increasingly difficult when the patient has not articulated
her desires clearly or at all, and when there is a lack of moral
consensus over what constitutes a person's good in a pluralistic
and secular society.'
Early gender assignment surgery easily fits into the category
explained above. Medical professionals differ greatly on the
appropriate model of care for intersexed infants, and the debate
over gender assignment surgery has recently sparked an explosion
of legal and moral controversy. In order to ensure that the
"particular 'patient's' good" 1 is advanced, and that the best
interests of the particular intersexed infant are promoted, courts
and legislatures should defer to the judgment of parents and
physicians in the decision over early gender assignment surgery.
A legal moratorium on such surgery would be inappropriate and
over-inclusive, treating all intersexed infants as having the same
environment, perspective, and interests, when, in fact, these factors
may vary greatly with each individual case.
A moratorium on gender assignment surgery would require
all intersexed infants to live through their formative years
without the psychological and medical benefits that gender
assignment surgery can bring, by forcing all intersexuals to forgo
surgery until they attain the age of maturity and may themselves
opt to undergo the procedure. This avenue may be in the best
interests of some intersexed infants, but there is no indication
that it is in the best interests of all of them. Indeed, the medical
community remains divided on the subject, with many medical
182. See State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962). In upholding an order to administer
needed blood transfusions to a minor over the objection of the minor's parents, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey suggested that deference may be given to parental treatment
preferences in situations when there is debate in the medical community over the
appropriate medical treatment for a minor child:
[Miedicine and surgery are not yet exact sciences and the result of any given
operation or treatment cannot be foretold with complete accuracy. However,
courts can be guided only by the prevailing medical opinion. Had there been
a relevant and substantial difference of medical opinion about the efficacy of
the proposed treatment . . . a strong argument could be made in favor of
appellants' position.
Id. at 760.
183. Rosato, supra note 105, at 34.
184. Id.
20051 457
458 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 11:427
professionals and intersexed individuals supporting the practice
of early gender assignment surgery.
There are certainly some infants who, as a result of their
particular personalities, cultural environment, proclivity to
succumb to peer pressure, and family belief system, might benefit
emotionally and mentally from early surgery. Supporting this
contention are reports suggesting that numerous intersexuals are
quite satisfied with the results of their early gender assignment
surgeries. 185 By denying all intersexed infants the opportunity
to undergo gender assignment surgery, irrespective of their
individual circumstances, moratorium advocates blatantly ignore
the significant benefits that surgery recipients can receive by
growing up with genitalia that comport with their assigned gender.
These advocates assume that preserving one's choice of gender
is the overriding concern of all intersexed individuals, severely
downplaying the serious psychological, social, and physical
difficulties that may confront a child bearing ambiguous genitalia.
Admittedly, some intersexuals might experience little or no
difficulty living a life in which their genitalia opposes their assigned
sex, and may not be troubled when facing a society that is not
always kind to individuals who fall outside its scope of traditional
gender norms. These individuals, by virtue of their innate
personalities or personal upbringing, might suffer no confusion
over gender identification, endure no ridicule from their peers, feel
no embarrassment in the locker room, and develop no body image
complexes. In these cases, it might be better to postpone gender
assignment surgery until the intersexed child is mature enough to
provide direct consent.
Other individuals, however, on account of their particular
intersex conditions, personal characteristics, religious surroundings,
or familial environment, might experience extreme hardship when
coping with the difficulties associated with growing up as
intersexuals. These individuals might be particularly sensitive to
the social ridicule, gender-identification and psychological issues,
locker-room banter, social discrimination, and moral judgments
that they will encounter due to their intersexual conditions. In
these cases, the intersexed children might benefit greatly from
early gender assignment surgery - and correspondingly, might
be harmed by a moratorium on the surgery. Allowing parents to
185. See, e.g., Susan J. Bradley et al., Experiment of Nurture: Ablatio Penis at 2 Months,
Sex Reassignment at 7 Months, and a Psychosexual Follow-up in Young Adulthood, 102
PEDIATRICS 9 (1998), available at http:/twww.pediatrics.orgcgi/content/full102/l/eq.
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provide consent to gender assignment surgery may be the optimum
way to safeguard the overall best interests of these children. A
blanket moratorium on such surgery would deprive all infants of
that treatment option - perhaps promoting the best interests of
some, but also compromising the best interests of others.'86
CONCLUSION
Absent any demonstrable conflict between the interests of the
family and the interests of the patient, and assuming that the
medical decision made by the family for the infant is within the
range of reasonableness, society should exhibit deference to
parents in the context of gender assignment surgery. Legislators
and courts should refrain from instituting a legal moratorium on
gender assignment surgery and recognize the legal capacity of
parents to consent to surgery on behalf of their intersexed infants.
SARA A. ALIABADI*
186. This concern that blanket regulations may be appropriate for some members of a
class but inappropriate for other members of the class is evidenced in Chief Justice Stone's
concurrence in Skinner v. Oklahoma. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942). Chief
Justice Stone wrote:
Moreover, if we must presume that the legislature knows - what science has
been unable to ascertain - that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual
offenders are transmissible regardless of the varying mental characteristics of
its individuals, I should suppose that we must likewise presume that the
legislature, in its wisdom, knows that the criminal tendencies of some classes
of offenders are more likely to be transmitted than those of others. And so I
think the real question we have to consider is . . . whether the wholesale
condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty, without
opportunity to any individual to show that his is not the type of case which
would justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process.
Id.
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